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COMMENTS
REAL PROPERTY-THE JOINT TENANCY IN WISCONSIN
The law of real property has acquired an interesting precedent in
the recently decided case of Hass v. Haas.* The question involved
arose in the construction of a deed. One Bertha Hass owned certain
real property, and in 1944 she engaged a realtor to draw the deed in
question for her. The deed was prepared on a printed form bearing
across its top the label: "Warranty Deed to Husband and Wife as
Joint Tenants." The granting clause provided that Bertha Hass for
a consideration, gives, grants, etc., "unto the said parties of the second
part, (Bertha Hass and her son Herbert Hass) a life estate as joint
tenants during their joint lives and an absolute fee forever in the re-
mainder to the survivor of them . . ." Following a description of the
property is this sentence: "The purpose of this conveyance is to vest
the title to the above described property in the grantees herein named
as joint tenants and none other." The habendum clause and the ma-
terial part of the warranty again refer to the grantees as joint tenants.
In an action by the administrator of the grantor for construction
of the deed, it was held that the instrument created in the parties a
tenancy in common for their joint lives and a vested remainder in
fee to the survivor.
Discussion of this question invites consideration of the exact
nature of the different estates of co-ownership. A brief reference will
be made to the nature and characteristics of the different estates in-
volved, namely: estates in joint tenancy, estates in common, and estates
by the entirety.
JOINT TENANCY
Estates in joint tenancy are created by purchase, exist in two or
more persons, and have the following characteristics :1
(1) Unity of time - the joint tenants must acquire the proper-
ty at the same time.
(2) Unity of title - the joint tenants must acquire their estate
through the same source and legal act.
(3) Unity of interest - each tenant must have exactly the
same quantity of interest and estate. One cannot have a life
estate and the other a fee.
(4) Unity of possession - each co-owner is entitled to posses-
sion and to his share of the income, and when one or more co-
tenants are actually in possession of the land, in the absence of
contradicting evidence, all of them are deemed to be in pos-
session.
* 248 Wis. 212, 21 N. W. (2d) 398, noted 44 Mich. L.R. 1144 (1946).
1. Reeves on Real Property, Chapter XLVIII, Vol. 11.
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(5) Suvivorship - upon the death of any joint tenant the
estate goes to the other joint tenant (s) by virtue of the original
conveyance. No interest descends to the heirs of the deceased
joint tenant. Because the survivor takes the estate by virtue of
the original conveyance, he takes free of dower or curtesy, and
the liens of creditors of the deceased tenant.
In Wisconsin the law of joint tenancy has undergone some changes
from the English common law. Section 230.442 creates an estate in
common unless joint estates are expressly provided.3 Section 230.454
excepts transfers to husband and wife, to executors, or in trust from
the presumption created by Section 230.44. The presumption may be
rebutted by a statement in the conveyance that a joint tenancy is
intended. These statutes have changed the common law in at least
two respects. For the first, the presumption has been changed. At
common law it was presumed as long as the unities were present a
jointure5 necessarily arose. Under these statutes as to grantees other
than those expressly enumerated it is presumed an estate in common
arises even where the unities exist unless otherwise specifically pro-
vided. For the second, the statute has dispensed with the unities of
time and title in conveyances between husband and wife. With the ex-
ception of these changes indicated in the statutes,6 Wisconsin follows
the common law rules regarding estates in joint tenancy and estates
in common. The unities of time and title were strict requirements at
2. Wis. Stat. (1945), 230.44 ESTATE IN COMMON. All grants and devises
of land made to two or more persons, except as provided in section 230.45,
shall be construed to create estates in common, and not in joint tenancy,
unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy.
3. Fries v. Kracklauer, 198 Wis. 547, 224 N. W. 717 (1929). Use of the wordjointly did not indicate a sufficient intention on the part of grantor to create
a joint tenancy. Weber v. Nedin. 210 Wis. 39, 246 N. '*A. 307, 246 N. W. 686
(1933). Use of the word survivor evinced a sufficient intention that the
grantor intended to create a joint estate, the word having no equivocal
meaning and being an incident of a joint tenancy..
4. Wis. Stat. (1945) 230.45 JOINT TENANCIES. (1) Section 230.44 shall
not apply to mortgages, nor to devises or grants made in trust, or made to
executors, or to husband and wife.
(2) Any deed, transfer or assignment or real or personal property from
husband to wife or from wife to husband which conveys an interest in the
grantor's lands or personal property and by its terms evinces an intent on
the part of the grantor to create a joint tenancy between grantor and
grantee shall be held and construed to create such joint tenancy, and any
husband and wife who are grantor and grantee in any such deed, transfer or
assignment heretofore given shall hold the property described in such deed,
transfer or assignment as joint tenants.(3) Any deed to two or more grantees which, by the method of describ-
ing such grantees or by the language of the granting or habendum clause
therein evinces an intent to create a joint tenancy in grantees shall be held
and construed to create such joint tenancy.
5. A jointure strictly signifies a joint estate limited to both husband and wife,
and such was its original form. 2 BI. Comm. 137; 1 Steph. Comm. 255.
6. Sections 230.44 and 230.45, supra.
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common law.7 It was impossible for A, the owner of an interest in
lands or personalty, to create a joint tenancy in himself and B by
a direct conveyance of a half-interest to B. Equally ineffective was
a conveyance by A as grantor, to A and B as grantees, for A would
continue to hold under his original title, by virtue of the doctrine
that a person cannot grant title to himself. The technical requirements
could be satisfied only by a conveyance from A to C, who would then
reconvey to A and B as joint tenants." Wisconsin has always recog-
nized the common law unities, and the statute discussed 9 was enacted
to change the operation of the common law rule as between husband
and wife. Public policy demanded the change to avoid the necessity
of an intervening third party to create a joint tenancy, so frequently
desired because of relationship between the parties.
ESTATES IN COMMON
Estates in common are estates in which the property is owned con-
currently by two or more persons, without right of survivorship, and
with no unity except that of possession.1 The trend of present day
law prefers a tenancy in common among the concurrent estates and
brings it into being whenever some other form of co-tenancy is not
expressly called for by the language of the parties or the circumstances
of the transaction."
ESTATES By THE ENTIRETY
Estates by the entireties' 2 are vested in husband and wife by virtue
of title acquired by them jointly after marriage ;13 are based on the
7. 2 Blackstone Commentaries, 180-187, 193; 33 Corpus Juris 903-909; 2
Thompson on Real Property (1924) sections 1710-1717; 1 Tiffany, Real
Property 2d. ed. (1920) section 191; 2 Tiffany, Real Property 3rd. ed. sec-
tion 421.
8. This strict requirement has led to legislation in several states which has
recognized that the common law unities existed and expressly provides for
their abrogation.
Mass. General Laws (1921) c. 184: "Real estate including any interest
therein, may be transferred by a person to himself jointly with another per-
son in the same manner in which it may be transferred by him to another
person."
Rhode Island General Laws (1933) c. 298, s. 20: "In deeds hereafter
made, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or a thing in action, may be
conveyed by a person to himself jointly with another person, and may in
like manner be conveyed by a husband alone or jointly with another person."
Under the laws of Arizona, a "joint tenancy" may be created by a
conveyance from one to himself and another as joint tenants. Rev. Code
Ariz. 1928, sec. 986; Greenwood v. Commissioner of Internall Revenue, 134
F (2d) 915.
9. Section 230.45, (2) supra.
10. Reeves on Real Property, Chapter L, Vol. II.
11. Ibid., page 970.
12. Reeves on Real Property, Chapter LI, Vol II.
Thompson on Real Property, Permanent Edition, Vol. 4, sections 1803-1826.
13. Federal. Breneman v. Corrigan, 4 Fed. (2d) 225 (1925) ; Arizona. Blackman
v. Blackman, 45 Ariz. 374, 43 Pac. (2d) 1011 (1935) ; Florida, Bailey v. Smith,
89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925) ; Newman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 119
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common law fiction that husband and wife are one,' 4 and, therefore,
there can be but one estate and, in contemplation of law, but one
person owning the whole.' 5 Upon the death of either the husband
or wife the entire estate and interest belongs to the other, not by virtue
of survivorship, but by virtue of the title that vested under the original
limitation. Tenancies by the entirety have three distinctive features:
first, such tenancies can be created only when the parties taking title
stand in the relationship of husband and wife at the time of the
grant or devise to them ;16 second, in addition to the unities of a joint
tenancy a fifth unity of persons is added ;17 and third, one of the
tenants, acting alone, cannot sever the estate.' Practically the only
method of destroying this estate is by an absolute divorce, or by a
voluntary partition or joint conveyance to a third party. Creditors
usually cannot create liens on the land.19 The effect of the Married
Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935); Iowa. Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.
W. 369 (1926); Maryland. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148
Atl. 444, 67 A. L. R. 1176 (1930); Massachusetts. Bernatavicius v. Berna-
tavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N. E. 685, 52 A. L. R. 886 (1927); Michigan.
Dutcher v. Van Duine, 242 Mich. 477, 219 N. W. 651 (1928); Missouri.
Ahmann v. Kemper, 342 Mo. 944, 119 S. W. (2d) 256 (1938); Clinton
County Trust Co. v. Metzger, 219 Mo. App. 365, 271 S. W. 1008 (1925);
New Jersey. Luebbers v. Luebbers, 97 N. J. Eq. 172, 127 Atl. 83 (1925)
(Tenancy by entirety not created) ; Central Trust Co. v. Street, 127 Atl. 82
N. J. 1923) (instrument determines rights of parties); New York Armondi
v. Dunham, 221 App. Div. 853, 225 N. Y. S. 87 (1927); North Carolina.
Southern Distributing Co. v. Carraway, 189 N. Car. 420, 127 S.E. 427 (1925)
(Tenancy in common); Oregon. Klorfine v. Dole, 121 Ore. 76, 252 Pac. 708
(1927) ; Schafer v. Schafer, 122 Ore. 620, 260 Pac. 206, 59 A.L.R. 707 (1927);
Wyoming. Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 Pac. (2d) 817 (1927).
14. Lang v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 289 U. S. 109, 77 L. Ed. 1066,
53 Sup. Ct. 534 (1933) ; Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936) ;
Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N. W. 369 (1926); Licker v. Gluskin,
265 Mass. 403, 164 N. E. 613, 63, 63 A.L.R. 231 (1929).
15. Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 883 (1925); Stanley v. Powers, 123
Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936); Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N. W. 369
1926); Voight v. Voight, 252 Mass. 582, 147 N. E. 887 (1925) Schafer v.
Schafer, 122 Ore. 620, 260 Pac. 206, 59 A.L.R. 707 (1927).
16. Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 109 AtI. 418 (1920); Bernatavicius v.
Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N. E. 685, 52 A.L.R. 886 (1927); McNitt
v. McNitt. 230 Mich. 303 N. W. 66 (1925); Armond v. Dunham, 221 App.
Div. 679, 225 N. Y. S. 87 (1927).
17. Parrish v. Parrish, 151 Ark. 161, 235 S. W. 792 (1921); Hoyt v. Winstanley,
221 Mich. 515, 191 N. W. 213 (1926); Davis v. Bass, 188 N. Car. 200, 124
S. E. 566 (1924) ; Schafer v. Schafer, 122 Ore. 620, 260 Pac. 206, 59 A.L.R.
707 (1927).
18. Bailey v. Sinith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925); Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa
1290, 207 N. W. 369 (1926); Marble v. Treasurer & Receiver General. 245
Mass. 504, 139 N. W. 442 (1923); Voight v. Voight, 252 Mass. 582, 147 N.
E. 887 (1925) ; Nurmi v. Beardsley, 275 Mich. 328, 266 N. W. 368 (1936) ;
Lopez v. McQuade, 151 Misc. 390, 273 N. Y. S. 34 (1934).;. Under the
statutes of Illinois either tenant may sever the estate by conveying his or her
interest to a stranger: Liese v. Hentze. 326 Ill. 633, 158 N. E. 428 (1927).
19. Taylor v. Carraway, 282 Fed. 878 (1922); A. Hupfel's Sons v. Getty, 299
Fed. 939 (1924); Hiller v. Olmstead, 54 Fed. (2d) 5 (1931); Hurd v.
Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 109 Atl., 418 (1920); American Wholesale Corp. v.
Aronstein, 56 App. D. C. 126, 10 Fed. (2d) 991 (1926); Ohio Butterine Co.
v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920); Gorelick v. Shapero, 222 Mich.
381, 192 N. I. 540 (1923); Turner v. Davidson, 227 Mich. 459, 198 N. W.
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Women's Property Acts on this estate has presented some difficulty.
Generally it has been held that such Act does not destroy the estate.2
0
It is held in this country that the Act is limited to the separate property
of married women, leaving unaffected and unimpaired the former law
regarding the creation, existence, and essential attributes and conse-
quences of estates by entireties. 21
Estates by the entireties are abolished by statute in Wisconsin.
Justice Cassoday in 190322 reached this conclusion after a discussion
of the history of the statutes.23 Section 230.43 of the statutes enumer-
ates the different estates recognized, namely: estates in severalty, in
joint tenancy, and in common. Since an enumeration is presumed
to be inclusive, estates by the entirety are abolished simply because
of their exclusion.
The question before the court in the instant case was how to give
effect to the intent of the parties to have survivorship where a joint
tenancy was impossible. The grantor used a form deed drawn to fit
the husband and wife statute, and conveyed to herself and her son
with the express intention of creating a joint tenancy. Although the
express intention was present, the unities of time and title were lacking.
A tenancy in common was the only legally possible result. The concept
of a tenancy in common for the life of the parties with vested cross
remainders gave substantial effect to the intention of the parties without
resort to the estate which the parties had in mind.
A recent Nebraska case illustrating the problem is Stuehm v. IVi-
kulski.2 4 There the husband conveyed to himself and his wife describ-
ing the grantees "as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common." In
the conveyance the grantor provided the property was to vest in the
survivor. In construing the deed the court held it created a tenancy
in common. Justice Carter, in his concurring opinion, stated the
886 (1924) ; Mahen v. Ruhr, 293 Mo. 500, 240 S. W. 164 (1922) ; Crawford
v. Kansas City Bolt and Nut Co., 278 S. XV~. 373 (1925 Mo.) ; Davis v. Bass,
188 N. Car: 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924) ; Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. Car. 682,
125 S. E. 490 (1924) ; Southern Distributing Co. v. Carraway, 189 N. Car.
420, 127 S. E. 427 (1925) ; Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 135 Atl. 10 (1926).
20. Jooss v. Fey, 129 N. Y. 17, 29 N. E. 136 (1891) ; Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y.
306, 39 N. E. 337, 30 L. R. A. 305, 43 Am. St. 762 (1895) ; Bennett v. Child,
19 Vis. 362, 88 Am. Dec. 692 (1865).
21. Blount v. United States, 47 S. Ct. 20, 273 U. S. 769, 71 L. Ed. 883 (1926);
Morrill v. Morrill, 138 Mich. 112, 101 N. W. 209, 110 Am. St. 306 (1904)
Armondi v. Dunham, 221 App. Div. 679, 225 N. Y. S. 87 (1926) (holding
that a divorce terminates the tenancy) ; In re Ray's Will, 188 Wis. 180,
205 N. W. 917 (1925).
22. Wallace v. St. John, 119 Wis. 585, 99 N. W. 197 (1903).
23. Wis. Stat. (1945) 230.43: SEVERALTY, JOINT TENANCY, IN COM-
MON. Estates, in respect to the number and connection of their owners, are
divided into estates in severalty, in joint tenancy and in common; the nature
and properties of which, respectively, shall continue to be such as are now es-
tablished by law, except so far as the same may be modified by the provisions
of these statutes. Wis. Stat. (1945) 230.44, 230.45.
24. Stuehm v. Mikulski,.297 N. W. 595, (Neb. 1941).
[Vol. 30
COMMENTS
reason why the court insisted on strict adherence to common law re-
quirements, when he said :25
"It is essential that titles, and estates in land be definite and
certain. It is not a field in which the court should undertake to
establish that it is liberal and modernistic in keeping pace with
changing conditions. The creation of hybrid estates unknown
to common law is to be deplored. It can only bring about un-
certainty, confusion and want of stability in estates and their
attributes. Carried to an absurd conclusion, there would eventu-
ally be as many different kinds of estates as there are tracts of
land. The plain duty of this court is in the opposite direction.
Many states have made changes by legislative action and this
is entirely proper. Other states have made such changes by
judicial fiat which have resulted in all the varied and conflicting
decisions cited in the dissent. I submit that it is the obligation
of this court to adhere to the landmarks of the common law
on this subject until we are directed by competent authority to
deviate therefrom."
Some state courts, however, have held to the contrary upon similar
fact situations.2 In a New York case m tenants in common of land
made a deed directly to one of the tenants and a third person as joint
tenants. The court held a jointure was created. The court in its
opinion stated :2s
"In all references to the "four unities" requisite to create a
joint tenancy, I find nothing that prevents their existence or
creation by the act of the grantor for himself and another as well
as by his act for two other persons. In Thomas' Coke on Little-
ton (vol. 1, p. 732), it is stated: If a man make a feoffment in
fee to the use of himself and of such wife as he should after-
wards marry for the terms of their lives and after he taketh a
wife, they are joint tenants; and yet they come to their estates
at several times - citing Brent's Case, 3 Dyer, 230. Here the
joint tenancy in the use is created by the act of the feoffer for
himself and another. If this were an exception to the general
rule, or peculiar to husband and wife, or the law of uses, some
mention would be made of it by Coke or Blackstone, as it is
cited in the chapter on joint tenancy."
In Blackstone's Commentaries it is stated 29 that "where a feoffment
was made to the use of a man and such a wife as he should after-
wards marry for a term of their lives, and he afterwards married;
25. Ibid., page 603.
26. Colson v. Baker, 42 Misc. 407, 87 N. Y. S. 238 (1904); Saxon v. Saxon, 46
Misc. 202, 93 N. Y. S. 191 (1905) ; Lawton v. Lawton, 48 R. 1. 134, 136 A.
241 (1927) ; Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929) ; Dutton
v. Buckley, 116 Or. 661, 242 P. 626 (1926) ; Coon v. Campbell, 138 Misc. 567,
240 N. Y. S. 772 (1930) ; Boehringer v. Schmid, 254 N. Y. 355, 173 N. E. 220.
(1930). In some of these cases a statute had changed the common-law rule.
27. Colson v. Baker, 42 fisc. 407, 87 N. Y. S. 238 (1904).
92. Ibid., page 239.
29. Blackstone's Commentaries by Chittey, Vol. 1, Chapter XII.
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in this case it seems to have been that husband and wife had a joint
estate, though vested at different times; because the use of the wife's
estate was in abeyance and dormant till intermarriage; and then being
awakened, had relation back, and took effect from the original time
of the creation." The New York court took this as a general rule at
common law. However, it would seem that the phrasing Blackstone
used, and the fact that special mention was made of this case, and
effort was made to justify it by straining a fiction of law, is enough
to indicate that this is not the general rule, but the exception.
It appears that some courts are willing to disregard the common
law unities and recognize joint tenancy where such was the parties'
intent. A glance at federal tax cases dealing with the question might
prove of interest. It should be noted however that regard for such
common law concepts as the unities requisite for joint tenancy is
not likely to be high where taxation is the issue. Two recent cases
cases are U. S. v. Jacobs,0 and Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.3 1 In U. S. v. Jacobs the difference between tenancies by the
entirety and joint tenancies was urged upon the court as basis for
subjecting but one half of the interest in the real property held in joint
tenancy to a death duty. The Supreme Court of the United States
stated :32
"The constitutionality of an exercise of the taxing power
of Congress is not to be determined by such shadowy and intri-
cate distinctions of common law property concepts and ancient
fictions."
In Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue the equitable
owners of trust property joined with a trust company in a declaration
of trust declaring it was their intention that said property should be
held by them as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The court
stated:3"
"In California, to create a joint tenancy there must be (1)
unity of interest; (2) unity of title; (3) unity of time; (4) unity
of possession. (Cases cited.) Petitioner argues that a person
cannot convey title to himself, because he is unable to make
delivery to himself ; that if a person conveys property to himself
and another as joint tenants, what he has done is to convey
an undivided half interest; that since the grantor and grantee
acquire their respective interests at different times, and that of
the grantor, when acquired, was not the same as that which
the grantee acquired, there is neither unity of title, nor unity of
time, and therefore no joint tenancy. This technical view is
30. U. S. v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 59 S. Ct. 551, 553 L. Ed. 763 (1939).
31. Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F. (2d) 14 (1937).
32. U. S. v. Jacobs, supra, p. 369.
33. Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue., supra, p. 16.
[Vol. 30
COMMENTS
followed in Breitenbach v. Schoen, 183 Wis. 589, 198 N. W.
622, and in Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N. E. 327,
62 A. L. R. 511.
' 3
4
"However, the weight of authority is opposed -to that view.
(Cases cited.) We believe the technical view should give way
to the intention of the parties, and hold that a joint tenancy
may be created by conveyance from one to himself and another,
as joint tenants."
The amazing thing about the instant case is really the device
used by the court to effectuate the intent of the parties. This makes
the decision unique. The Wisconsin court did not strain the common
law joint tenancy as did the New York court 35 in giving way to the
intention of the parties, nor did it disregard the fundamental natures
of the common law estates as did the Federal Courts in the tax cases.
The court recognized at the outset no joint tenancy was created and
could not be under the common law or the statutes. There was no
doubt about this, and little argument about it. But the court obtained
the legal effect of a joint tenancy by superimposing upon the tenancy
in common, vested cross remainders, dependent or contingent upon
survivorship. Here is the unique device, survivorship imposed upon a
tenancy in common by the device of vested cross remainders. And
it is more than survivorship, because the court says expressly that all
the legal attributes of remainders follow. These rights of survivorship
are vested and cannot be destroyed through severance by a conveyance
by one or more of the tenants, as is the case with the rights of
survivorship in a joint tenancy.
KATHLEEN LANDMAN
34. Breitenbach v. Schoen, 183 Wis. 589, 198 N. W. 622 (1924) cited in the in-
stant case (Hass v. Hass) was overruled by the Wisconsin court in 1935 in
Estate of Starver: Wimmer v. Starver, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N. W. 655 (1935);
Estate of Skilling, 218 Wis. 574, 260 N. W. 660 (1935).
35. Colson v. Baker, supra., note 27.
